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Abstract 
Jamming attacks are especially harmful when ensuring the dependability of wireless communication. Typically, 
jamming has been addressed under an external threat model. Adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol 
speciﬁcations and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. 
The problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks is addressed in this work. In these attacks, the 
adversary is active only for a short period of time,  specifically targeting messages of high importance. The 
advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort is illustrated 
by presenting two case studies; one is selective attack on TCP and another is on routing. The selective jamming 
attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classiﬁcation at the physical layer. To avoid these 
attacks, four schemes are developed such as All Or Nothing Transformation-Hiding Scheme (AONT-HS) - 
pseudo  message  is  added  with  message  before  transformation  and  encryption,  Strong  Hiding  Commitment 
Scheme(SHCS) - off-the-shelf symmetric encryption is done, Puzzle Based Hiding Scheme(PBHS)- time lock 
and hash puzzle  and Nonce based Authenticated Encryption Scheme(N-AES)-Nonce is used for encryption, 
that prevent real-time packet classiﬁcation by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. 
Index Terms— Selective jamming, Pseudo message, Symmetric encryption, Time lock puzzles, Nonce based 
Authentication. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Wireless  Local  Area  Networks  (WLANs) 
are  becoming  an  increasingly  important  technology 
that is bringing the world closer together. WLANs are 
essential in every area, such as education, agriculture, 
manufacturing, transportation, military, research and 
so  on.  Therefore,  the  WLAN  security  is  very 
significant. There are two popular styles of WLANs: 
Client-server  networks  and  Ad-hoc  networks.  The 
variation between these two networks is that client-
server  networks  use  access  points  or  routers  to 
transmit data, but ad-hoc networks do not rely upon 
any  pre-existing  transmitters.  Alternatively,  all  the 
nodes in an ad-hoc network participate in the routing 
process by forwarding messages to each other. 
All  wireless  network  nodes  transmit  data 
packets  in  different  channels.  Hence  channels  in 
WLANs  are  defined  by  frequencies;  they  are 
susceptible  to  malicious  jamming  attacks  which  is 
easy for attackers to accomplish sending multitudes 
of useless packets in a specific frequency. Wireless 
networks rely on the uninterrupted availability of the 
wireless medium to interconnect participating nodes. 
Anyway, the open nature of this medium leaves it  
 
vulnerable  to  multiple  security  threats.  Any  nodes 
with  a  transceiver  can  eavesdrop  on  wireless 
transmissions,  add  spurious  messages,  or  jam 
legitimate  ones.  While  message  injection  and 
eavesdropping can be prevented using cryptographic 
methods,  jamming  attacks  are  very  difficult  to 
counter.    They  have  been  identified  to  actualize 
severe  Denial-of-Service  (DoS)  attacks  against 
wireless networks. The adversary interferes with the 
reception of  messages by transmitting a continuous 
jamming signal or several short jamming pulses. 
Typically,  jamming  attacks  have  been 
considered  under  an  external  threat  model,  where 
jammer is not part of the network. Under this model, 
jamming  techniques  include  the  continuous  or 
random  transmission  of  high-power  interference 
signals. However, adopting an ―always-on‖ strategy 
has  several  drawbacks.  First,  the  adversary  has  to 
expend  a  vast  amount  of  energy  to  jam  signals  of 
interest.  Second,  the  continuous    transmission  of 
unusually high interference levels makes this  type of 
attacks  easy  to  detect  Conventional  anti-jamming 
techniques rely extensively  on spread-spectrum (SS) 
communications or some  form of jamming evasion 
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(e.g., slow frequency hopping,  or spatial retreats )SS 
techniques provide bit-level protection  by spreading 
bits according to a secret pseudo-noise  (PN) code, 
known  only  to  the  communicating  parties.  Hence 
these methods can only protect wireless transmissions 
under the external threat model.  
Potential  disclosure  of  secrets  due  to  node 
compromise  neutralizes  the  gains  of  Spread 
Spectrum. Broadcast communications are particularly 
vulnerable under an internal threat model because all 
intended receivers must be aware of the secrets used 
to protect transmissions. Thus, the compromise of a 
single  receiver  is  enough  to  reveal  relevant 
cryptographic  information.  To  launch  selective 
jamming attacks, the adversary must have capability 
to  implement  a  ―classify-then-jam‖  strategy  before 
the  completion  of  a  wireless  transmission.  Such 
strategy can be done either by classifying transmitted 
packets  using  protocol  semantics  or  by  decoding 
packets during transmission. In the next method, the 
jammer may decode the first few bits of a packet for 
recovering useful packet identifiers such as type of 
the  packet,  source  and  destination  address.  After 
classifying  those data, the adversary  must induce a 
sufficient  number  of  bit  errors  so  that  the  packet 
cannot  be  recovered  at  the  receiver.  Selective 
jamming requires knowledge of the physical (PHY) 
layer, as well as of the specifics of upper layers.  
 
1.1Wireless LAN Security 
Wireless LAN security has come a long way 
since the early days and the negative publicity around 
the  shortcomings  of  WEP.  Recent  advances  in 
WLAN  technology  and  the  ratification  of  key 
wireless  security  standards  are  giving  Network 
administrators the high level of confidence in WLAN 
security  that  they  have  always  needed.  To  be 
effective, WLAN security must address three critical 
areas;  
   Data Confidentiality and Integrity,  
   Authentication and Access Control  
   Intrusion Detection and Prevention  
 
1.2WLAN Security Threats   
The nature of networking means that users 
can exchange information across a distance and over 
a shared medium. The security breach of this is that a 
hacker does not need to actually walk up to a server 
or a user’s computer in order to gain access to critical 
files  or  communications.  In  W  LAN,  this  threat  is 
especially mentioned, because a hacker doesn’t need 
to reside in the same physical location. Some Threats 
to the wireless network initially stem from providing 
openings like those described below 
 
 
 
1.2.1Unauthorized Client Access 
Hackers  continually  probe  areas  for  open 
wireless  networks.  If  a  network  has  a  weak  user 
authentication  scheme  –  or none  at  all  –  it  is  very 
easy  for a hacker to obtain  access to the corporate 
network  and  take  information  or  launch  attacks  on 
resources in order to cause disruptions.  
 
1.2.2Denial of Service (DoS) 
Because  of  the  way  networking  devices 
work,  they  need  to  respond  to  any  client  requests. 
Hackers  are  able  to  exploit  this  by  inundating  a 
network resource with more requests than it is able to 
handle. Distributed DoS attacks magnify this problem 
by  enlisting  a  number  of  unknowing  computers 
through hidden code to simultaneously launch denial 
of service attacks on a potentially massive scale. 
 
1.2.3Man in the Middle  
  If  data  is  unsecured,  hackers  can  intercept 
messages and change the content to mislead parties 
that  are  communicating,  making  it  seem  as  if  the 
hacker is actually one of the parties. 
 
1.2.4 IP Spoofing 
By  modifying  the  source  IP  address 
contained in the packet header, a hacker can intercept 
traffic coming from a legitimately authenticated user 
and make it appear that the user is actually using the 
hacker’s computer. As a result, all data and messages 
coming from a server would go back to the hacker. 
 
II.  Existing Work 
2.1Existing concepts & methodology 
Conventional  anti-jamming  techniques  rely 
extensively  on  Spread-Spectrum  (SS) 
communications  or  some  form  of  jamming  evasion 
(e.g.,  slow  frequency  hopping).  SS  techniques 
provide  bit-level  protection  by  spreading  bits 
according to a secret pseudo-noise (PN) code, known 
only to the communicating nodes. These methods can 
only protect wireless transmissions under the external 
threat model. 
 
2.2 Problem statement 
Broadcast  communications  are  particularly 
vulnerable under an internal threat model because all 
intended receivers must be aware of the secrets used 
to  protect  transmissions.  The  open  nature  of  the 
wireless  medium  leaves  it  vulnerable  to  intentional 
interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. 
Anyone with a transceiver can eavesdrop on wireless 
transmissions,  add  spurious  messages,  or  jam 
legitimate ones. Hence, the compromise of a single 
receiver is sufficient to reveal relevant cryptographic 
information. 
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III. Proposed Work 
3.1objective 
To show that selective jamming attacks can 
be  launched  by  performing  real  time  packet 
classification at the physical layer. To reduce these 
attacks schemes are developed that prevent real-time 
packet  classification  by  combining  cryptographic 
primitives with physical layer attributes. An intuitive 
solution  to  selective  jamming  would  be  the 
encryption of transmitted packets (including headers) 
with a key. For broadcast communications, this static 
key must be known to intended receivers and hence, 
is vulnerable to compromise. Even if the encryption 
key of a hiding scheme were to kept secret, the static 
parts of a transmitted packet could potentially lead to 
packet  classification.  To  avoid  these  attacks,  four 
schemes  are  developed  such  as  All  Or  Nothing 
Transformation-Hiding  Scheme  (AONT-HS)  - 
pseudo  message  is  added  with  message  before 
transformation  and  encryption,  Strong  Hiding 
Commitment  Scheme(SHCS)  -  off-the-shelf 
symmetric encryption is done, Puzzle Based Hiding 
Scheme(PBHS)-  time  lock  and  hash  puzzle    and 
Nonce  based  Authenticated  Encryption  Scheme(N-
AES)-Nonce is used for encryption, that prevent real-
time  packet  classiﬁcation  by  combining 
cryptographic  primitives  with  physical-layer 
attributes. 
 
3.2All or Nothing Transformation Hiding Scheme 
AONT-HS  represents  All  or  Nothing 
Transformation Hiding Scheme. An AONT serves as 
a  publicly  known  and  completely  invertible  pre-
processing step to a plaintext before it is passed to an 
ordinary  block  encryption  algorithm.  A 
transformation f,  mapping  message  m = {m1, · ·  ·, 
mx} to a   sequence of pseudo-messages m′ = {m′   1   
, · · · , m′   x′}   In this context, packets are pre-
processed by an AONT before transmission but left 
unencrypted.  Thus,  the  jammer  cannot  perform 
packet  classiﬁcation  until  all  pseudo-messages   
corresponding  to  the  original  packet  have  been 
received      and  the  inverse  transformation  has  been 
applied. Packet m   is split to a set of x input blocks m 
= {m1. . . mx},   which serve as an input to an AONT 
f : {Fu}   x → {Fu}   x   ′   .   Here, Fu denotes the 
alphabet of blocks mi and x   ′ denotes   the number 
of output pseudo-messages with x   ′ ≥ x. 
The   set of pseudo-messages m′ = {m′   1   . 
. . m′   x′} is transmitted   over the shared wireless 
medium.  At  the  receiver  end,  the  inverse 
transformation f −1   is applied after all x ′ pseudo-
messages   are received, in order to obtain m.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: All Or Nothing Transformation Hiding Scheme 
 
3.3Puzzle based Hiding Scheme 
The  basic  idea  behind  such  puzzles  is  to 
force the recipient of a puzzle execute a pre-deﬁned 
set  of  computations  before  he  is  able  to  extract  a 
secret of interest. The time needed for obtaining the 
solution of a puzzle depends on its hardness and the 
computational  ability  of  the  puzzle  solver.  The 
advantage of the puzzle based hiding scheme is that 
its  security  does  not  rely  on  the  PHY  layer 
parameters.  It  has  higher  computation  and 
communication  overhead.  Here  puzzles  are  used  to 
temporarily hide transmitted packets. A packet m is 
enciphered with a randomly selected symmetric key 
(k) of a desirable length s. The key k is blinded using 
a  puzzle  and  sent  to  the  receiver.  For  a 
computationally  bounded  receiver  or  adversary,  the 
puzzle carrying k is difficult to be solved before the 
transmission  of  the  encrypted  version  of  m  is 
completed  and  the  puzzle  is  received.  Thus,  the 
adversary  cannot  classify  the  packet  m  for  the 
purpose of selective jamming. 
 
3.3.1Time-lock Puzzle 
It is based on the iterative application of a 
precisely  controlled  number  of  modulo  operations. 
Time-lock puzzles have more attractive features such 
as  the  fine  granularity  in  controlling  tp  and  the 
sequential nature of the computation. Also, the puzzle 
generation  requires  significantly  less  computation 
compared puzzling. In this type of puzzle, the puzzle 
constructor generates a composite modulus g = u ・v, 
where u and v are two large random prime numbers. 
Then, he picks a random a, 1 < a < g and hides the 
encryption key in Kh = k + a2t mod g, where t = tp・ 
N, is the amount of time required to solve for k. Here, 
it  is  considered  that  the  solver  can  perform  N 
squarings  mod(g) per second. Note that  Kh can be 
calculated efficiently if φ(g) = (u − 1)(v − 1) or the 
factorization  of  g  are  known,  otherwise  a  solver 
would have to do all t squarings to recover k. The 
puzzle consists of the values P = (g,Kh, t, a). 
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Fig 2: Puzzle based Hiding Scheme 
 
3.3.2Puzzles based on hashing 
Computationally limited receivers can incur 
significant  delay  and  energy  consumption  when 
dealing with modulo arithmetic. Here, CPHS can be 
implemented  from  cryptographic  puzzles  which 
employ  computationally  efficient  cryptographic 
primitives.  Client  puzzles,  use  one-way  hash 
functions  with  partially  disclosed  inputs  to  force 
puzzle solvers search through a space of a precisely 
controlled  size.  In  this  context,  the  sender  picks  a 
random key k with k = k1||k2. The lengths of k1 and 
k2 are s1, and s2, respectively. Then he computes C = 
Ek(π1(m))  and  transmits  (C,  k1,  h(k))  by  this 
particular  order.  To  recover  k,  any  receiver  has  to 
perform on average 2s2−1 hash operations (assuming 
perfect hash functions).  Since the puzzle cannot be 
solved before h(k) has been received, the receiver or 
any  adversary  cannot  classify  m  before  the 
completion of m’s transmission.  
 
3.4Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme 
SHCS  represents  Strong  Hiding 
Commitment  Scheme.  The  main  motivation  is  to 
satisfy the strong hiding property while keeping the 
computation  and  communication  overhead  to  a 
minimum. Consider that the sender S has a packet m 
for R. First, S constructs (C, d) = commit (m), where, 
C = Ek(π1(m)), d = k. Here, the commitment function 
Ek()  is  an  off-the-shelf  symmetric  encryption 
algorithm (e.g., Triple DES), π1 is a publicly known 
permutation, and k ∈ {0,1} s is a randomly selected 
key of some desired key length s (the length of k is a 
security  parameter).  The  sender  broadcasts  (C||d), 
where  ―||‖  denotes  the  concatenation  operation.  On 
reception  of  d,  any  receiver  R  computes  m  = 
π⁻1(Dk(C)),  where  π  −1  1  denotes  the  inverse 
permutation  of  π1.  To  achieve  the  strong  hiding 
property, the packet containing d is formatted so that 
all bits of d, are harmonized in the last few PHY layer 
attributes  of  the  packet.  To  obtain  d,  any  receiver 
must  receive  and  decode  the  last  symbols  of  the 
transmitted packet, hence avoiding early disclosure of 
d.  
 
3.4.1Permutation 
This  scheme  applies  two  publicly  known 
permutations π1 and π2 at different processing stages. 
Permutation π1 is applied to m before it is encrypted. 
The purpose of π1 is twofold. Initially, it distributes 
critical  frame  fields  which  can  be  used  for  packet 
classification across multiple plaintext blocks. Thus, 
to reconstruct these  fields, all corresponding cipher 
blocks must be received and deciphered. Also, header 
information  is  pushed  at  the  end  of  π1  (m).  This 
prevents  early  reception  of  the  corresponding 
ciphertext blocks. 
 
Fig 3: Application of permutation π1 on packet m. 
 
3.5Nonce based Authenticated Encryption Scheme 
MAC tree construction is used to build a file 
encryption  scheme.  Let  D  =  D1…….Dn  where  Di  έ 
{0,1}
d  the  content  of  the  file.  Nonce-based 
authenticated  encryption  scheme  is  applied  to  each 
file block Di, using the leafcounter Ni
(0):(Ci, Ti)  ← 
EK(Ni
(0),  Di),and  store  the  ciphertextCi  and  the 
authentication tag Ti to the untrusted storage, along 
with the MAC tree for maintaining the leaf counters 
Ni
(0).  A  simple  authenticated  encryption  scheme  is 
constructed  as  composition  of  the  CTR  encryption 
mode  of  operation  and  the  MAC  scheme.  Figure 
shows the composite scheme: using the counter Ni
(0),  
a  pseudorandom  sequence  is  generated  by  the 
Counter mode, the file block Di is XORed with this 
sequence to produce the ciphertext block Ci, and the 
counter Ni
(0)  is used to authenticate Ci, producing the 
authentication tag Ti.Special care is needed to never 
re-use a nonce throughout our construction. Note that 
here the counter Ni
(0) is used both for encryption and 
authentication. In fact, here the counter is not used 
directly,  but  uses  different  encoding  schemes  to 
generate non-repeating nonces. 
 
Fig 4: Block-wise Authenticated based 
Encryption 
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3.5.1Security of the scheme 
Intuitively, it is easy to see that, if MAC tree 
construction is not used, and instead manage all of the 
leaf  counters  Nk
(0)  in  the  trusted  storage,  then  this 
scheme guarantees both confidentiality and integrity 
of  the  file  content:  all  the  block  counters  Nk
(0)  are 
properly incremented, and no nonce is repeated, and 
each  file  blocks  are  encrypted  and  authenticated 
independent  from  each  other.  Essentially,  the 
confidentiality  and  the  integrity  of  the  resulting 
scheme  come  from  the  security  of  the  composite 
authenticated  encryption  scheme,  and  the  nonce-
respecting  property.  In  this  scheme,  instead  of 
managing the leaf counters in the trusted storage, they 
are  stored  in  MAC  tree  and  store  only  the  root 
counter in the trusted storage. Still, from the way the 
MAC tree is constructed, the trust of the root counter 
can be transferred to its descendants, as long as all of 
the tag verifications along the path are successful. In 
this way, it is ensured that our MAC tree construction 
can safely replace counters stored in a trusted storage, 
except negligible probability of successful attack. 
 
IV. System Design 
 
Fig 5: Architecture for preventing real time packet 
classification 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The problem of selective jamming attacks in 
wireless networks is addressed in this work. In these 
attacks, the adversary is active only for certain period 
of  time,  specifically  targeting  messages  of  high 
importance. The advantages of selective jamming in 
terms  of  network  performance  degradation  and 
adversary  effort  is  illustrated.  An  internal adversary 
model is considered, where the jammer is one of the 
parts of the network under attack, thus it is aware of 
the protocol specifications and shared network secrets. 
The  selective  jammer  can  significantly  impact 
performance  with  very  low  effort.  The  selective 
jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-
time  packet  classiﬁcation  at  the  physical  layer.  To 
avoid these attacks, four schemes are developed such 
as  All  Or  Nothing  Transformation-Hiding  Scheme 
(AONT-HS) - pseudo message is added with message 
before transformation and encryption, Strong Hiding 
Commitment  Scheme(SHCS)  -  off-the-shelf 
symmetric encryption is done, Puzzle Based Hiding 
Scheme(PBHS)-  using  time  lock  and  hash  puzzles  
and  Nonce  based  Authenticated  Encryption 
Scheme(N-AES)-Nonce  is  used  for  encryption,  that 
prevent real-time packet classiﬁcation by combining 
cryptographic  primitives  with  physical-layer 
attributes. 
 
VI. Future Work 
To improve the efficiency of these schemes 
in  terms  of  time  by  using  cryptography  based 
algorithms  which  consumes  less  time  and  provides 
more security. 
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